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A WHOLE NEW WORLD OF FALSE-CLAIMS-ACT
LIABILITY: THE 2009 AMENDMENTS AND
LEARNING WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE
David Baker+
Justice Stephen Breyer described the danger of reading the False Claims Act
(FCA) expansively when he stated, “government money today is in everything.
So if it’s in everything, then everything is going to become subject to this False
Claims Act.”1 To limit the scope of the FCA, the Supreme Court unanimously
held in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders that the FCA
applies only to those who intentionally defraud the government.2 However,
Congress opposed the Court’s decision and amended the FCA through the
Fraud and Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA),3 which allow entities
with no nexus to the government to face FCA liability.4 This latest iteration of
the statute creates problems of vagueness and overbreadth and perverts the
statute’s original purpose of combating fraud against the government.5
The Supreme Court based its Allison Engine decision on the “presentment
clause” in the FCA, which required that a false claim be presented to the
government itself for an individual to be prosecuted under the auspices of the
Act.6 When Congress amended the statute, however, it removed the language
and eliminated the presentment requirement.7 Rather, the current version of
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
M.A., 2007, Queen's University of Belfast; B.A., 2006, Queen's University of Belfast. The author
would like to thank Tom Holliday for his expertise and invaluable insight, Jen Siegel for her
feedback, and Jack Raffeto for his recommendations and guidance throughout the writing
process. He would also like to thank his wife, Adrienne, for her loving support, patience, and
encouragement, and the members of the Catholic University Law Review for their diligent work.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,
553 U.S. 662 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31
U.S.C.) (No. 07-214). Justice Scalia echoed this sentiment, and stated that the FCA “doesn’t
have to cover every ill in the world.” Id. at 37.
2. 553 U.S. at 671–72.
3. FERA, §4(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 1621–25.
4. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
5. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67
(stating the purpose of the FCA is to combat fraud and “recover losses sustained as a result of
fraud against the Government”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (1863).
6. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
7. FERA, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617 at 1621 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009)). Currently, liability attaches under this section when a person
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a
false or fraudulent claim.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). The section’s predecessor originally read:
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or
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the FCA predicates liability on the submission of a false claim to recipients of
government money where a government interest is advanced.8
The FCA’s amendments are reminiscent of those made to the mail-fraud
statute, which Congress enacted to combat fraud perpetrated through the U.S.
Postal Service.9 After the Supreme Court limited the scope of the mail-fraud
statute,10 Congress expanded its applicability through ambiguous
amendments,11 contributing to decades of arbitrary prosecutions.12 Decades
elapsed before the Supreme Court addressed the problems created by
Congress’s overzealousness and the resulting legal chaos caused by disparate
lower-court rulings under the mail-fraud statute.13 The Supreme Court—or
Congress—must now act swiftly to avoid the same result in relation to the
FCA, lest entire industries endure decades of uncertainty regarding the rules
governing their business conduct.14

fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.” Id. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis
added).
8. FERA, § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1617 at 1623 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(b)(2) (Supp. III 2009)).
9. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 149 and 301, 17 Stat. 302, 323 (repealed 1909)
(criminalizing the use of the mail system for “any scheme or artifice to defraud”). Enacted in
1952, the wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, is a descendant of the mail-fraud statute, with
nearly identically wording and construction. See Peter R. Ezersky, Intra-Corporate Mail and
Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1429 n.8 (1985)
(explaining that “[t]he mail and wire fraud statutes have been identically construed”); Jed S.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 n.6 (1980). These
two statutes combined target a “full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank
frauds, insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, [and also] . . . such areas as blackmail,
counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery.” Rakoff, supra, at 772. Because the mail- and
wire-fraud statutes are so similar, and judicial decisions addressing one are usually applicable to
the other, this Comment will concentrate on the more frequently used mail-fraud statute. See,
e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire fraud statutes
share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to [the mail
and wire fraud] offenses here.”).
10. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (noting the statute should be
“limited in scope to the protection of property rights”), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
11. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. at 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2006)) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”).
12. See infra Part I.H. Although the mail-fraud statute is a criminal statute and the FCA is a
civil statute, the FCA’s hefty fines and treble damages resemble criminal sanctions. See 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
13. See infra Part I.H.
14. See Robert J. Wagman, The Risks of Doing Business with the Government Are Getting
Riskier, 47 ADVOC. 62, 62–68 (2009) (discussing the unique challenges presented by doing
business with the government). An expansive application of the FCA poses a particular problem
for defense contractors, as defense contracts are often very large and complex and the contractors
themselves often subcontract with other companies. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex
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This Comment advocates limiting the FCA to reflect its core
purpose—combating the fraudulent presentment of false claims to the
government. Part I provides a legislative and statutory history of the FCA,
examines the FCA’s purpose, and summarizes both the Supreme Court’s
Allison Engine decision and the subsequent FERA amendments. In addition,
this Part offers a brief history of the mail-fraud statute and describes the issues
that arose when the Supreme Court remedied the statutory vagueness. Part II
explores the consequences of FCA overbreadth by comparing the FCA to the
mail-fraud statute and outlining the significance of the economic and judicial
costs of the amendments. Part III argues for a legislative or judicial remedy to
prevent expansion of the FCA’s scope. It proposes two legislative solutions:
either eliminating current ambiguities in the FCA’s definition of “claim,” or
including a mandatory arbitration or mediation requirement before the
commencement of litigation. Finally, in the absence of a legislative remedy,
the Supreme Court should narrowly interpret the ambiguous term “claim” in
the FCA.
I. THE FCA AND THE MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE
Both the FCA and the mail-fraud statute originated in the latter half of the
nineteenth century.15 This Part traces the statutes from their beginnings to their
current iterations and highlights relevant milestones along the way.
A. The Purpose of the FCA
During the last twenty-five years, the FCA has been the foremost
civil-enforcement tool in combating fraud against the government.16 The
statute gained popularity as an antifraud weapon because of its treble damages
and heavy penalty provisions.17
1. Origins of the FCA and Concerns About Waste in Wartime
Congress first enacted the FCA in 1863 against the backdrop of the
American Civil War.18 Known as the Informer’s Act, the statute permitted
private qui tam informers to initiate fraud actions on behalf of the
rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671–72 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, §
4(a)(1),123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
15. See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 1-6 (4th ed. 2011)
(noting the FCA’s origin); Ezersky, supra note 9, at 1428 (discussing the purpose of the
mail-fraud statute, which Congress enacted in 1870).
16. See BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-5 to 1-6 (noting the 1986 amendments helped make the
FCA the potent force that it is today). Between 1987 and 2010, FCA judgments and settlements
totaled over $27 billion. Fraud Statistics-Overview: October 1, 1987–September, 30 2010, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs-forms/C_FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (last
visited Sept. 4, 2011).
17. BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-5.
18. See id. § 1.01[A], at 1-8 (providing a brief overview of the origins of the FCA).
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government.19 The statute was “aimed at bringing to punishment those who
commit frauds upon the Government and to recover money that has been
obtained by fraud from the U.S. Government under contracts between the
Government and private citizens.”20 Although the Act “was applicable to
fraud by government claimants generally,” it primarily targeted
military-procurement fraud.21
Private military contractors contributed to widespread abuse and fraud
during this time22—a problem magnified by the complexity of the Union
government’s wartime spending.23 Recognizing the enormity of the problem,
the legislative debates before the statute’s enactment focused on “ferreting out
and punishing these enormous frauds upon [the] Government.”24
As government spending fell after the Civil War, so did interest in the
FCA.25 However, during the 1930s and 1940s, with the passage of the New
Deal and increased military spending preceding World War II, the FCA once
again drew Congress’s attention.26 Congress’s amendments to the statute in
19. See BOESE supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1-9. The original statute required qui tam
litigants to pay their legal costs and fees; this provision aimed to prevent frivolous qui tam
lawsuits from overburdening the courts. Id. § 1.01[A], at 1-12. See infra Part I.D. for an
explanation of qui tam actions.
20. 89 CONG. REC. 7596 (1943) (statement of Sen. William Chapman Revercomb).
21. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1-12 (citations omitted).
22. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Inc., 722 F. Supp.
607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“‘For sugar it [the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for
leather, something no better than brown paper; for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts and
dying donkeys; and for serviceable muskets and pistols, the experimental failures of sanguine
inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armories.’” (quoting FRED ALBERT SHANNON, THE
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861–1865, at 58 (1965))); see
also J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000) (revealing that contractors provided the Union
Army with “artillery shells filled with sawdust rather than explosives”).
23. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1-8.
24. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson).
Senator Jacob M. Howard, the principal sponsor of the bill, called it a “crying evil[] of the
period . . . that [the] Treasury is plundered from day to day by bands of conspirators, who are
knotted together in this city and other large cities for the purpose of defrauding and plundering
the Government.” Id. at 955–56 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). The text of the Act itself also
reflected the specific purpose of combating fraud against the government:
[The Act targeted persons] who shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to
be presented for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil or
military service of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the
United States . . . knowing such claim to bo [sic] false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . for
the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of such
claim . . . .
An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat.
696, 696 (1863).
25. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.01[B], at 1-13.
26. Id. (stating that this increase in spending created opportunity, once again, for fraud
against the government).
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1943 left the traditional purpose of the FCA unchanged, while shifting the
FCA’s focus to “‘parasitic’ qui tam suits”—a change that made it more
difficult for private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the government. 27
2. A Large National Deficit and New Concerns About Waste: The 1986
Amendments
The “growing pervasiveness” of fraud against the government led to further
amendments in 1986.28 Fear, caused by the dramatically increased national
deficit, provided the impetus for the amendments29 and contributed to an
atmosphere analogous to when Congress first passed the Act in 1863—a time
when fraud against the government “was seen as posing a severe threat to
national interests.”30
The 1986 amendments to the FCA reflected the perceived danger to the
national purse.31 Among other changes, Congress lowered the standard of
intent for certain violations of the FCA, lengthened the statute of limitations,
increased the severity of the damages and penalty provisions, and increased the
qui tam litigants’ percentage of successful recoveries.32 These amendments
turned the FCA into the federal government’s foremost antifraud statute.33
Despite these amendments, the historic purpose of the FCA remained intact,
as evidenced by an accompanying Senate report, which explicitly stated that
the amendments were intended “to enhance the Government’s ability to
recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.”34 The
27. See Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 11 & n.2, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008),
superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123
Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.) (No. 07-214).
28. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. The
number of fraud investigations conducted by the Department of Defense rose thirty percent
between 1982 and 1984; similarly, from 1983 to 1986, the Department of Health and Human
Services “nearly tripled the number of entitlement program fraud cases referred for prosecution.”
Id., 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267.
29. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[A], at 1-20; see also Summary of Receipts, Outlays,
and Surpluses or Deficits (-): 1789–2016, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) [hereinafter
Summary of Budget Receipts]. In 1979, the budget deficit was $40.7 billion dollars; six years
later it stood at $221.2 billion. Id.
30. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[A], at 1-20 to 1-21.
31. Id. § 1.04[A], at 1-19 to 1-21.
32. See False Claims Amendments Act (FCAA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 100 Stat.
3153, 3153–54 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)).; see also BOESE, supra note
15, § 1.04[B], 1-21 to 1-25 (“The amendments for the first time defined the term ‘knowingly’ to
make clear that a showing of ‘specific intent to defraud is no longer required.’” (internal footnote
omitted)).
33. See Fraud Statistics-Overview, supra note 16. In 1987, relators filed only thirty new
qui tam cases and failed to collect any rewards. Id. Ten years later, qui tam litigants filed 547
new cases and collected over $67.5 million in rewards. Id.
34. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67.
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report further noted that “[t]he False Claims Act is intended to reach all
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money or to
deliver property or services.”35 The report also quoted Justice Hugo Black,
who called the statute “a remedial one . . . intended to protect the Treasury
against the hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side.”36
Similarly, the House report accompanying the amendments emphasized the
need to recoup government losses given the country’s financial situation. 37
3. The FERA Amendments: An Even Bigger Economic Crisis
The factors instigating the 2009 FERA legislation were very similar to the
circumstances giving rise to both the original FCA in 1863 and the 1986
amendments. High government spending and worries about defrauders
exploiting the country during crisis motivated legislative action.38 This time,
35. Id. at 9, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274.
36. Id. at 11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5276 (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366
(D. Or. 1885)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 18 (1986).
[A]ctive enforcement of this statute will not only result in a recovery of losses resulting
from fraud, but that it will also serve as a deterrent to those who otherwise might
consider defrauding the Government. Moreover, given the current budgetary situation,
it is imperative that the Government recoup these fraud losses and deter future
fraudulent activities that result in further losses to the Government.
Id.
38. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 1–2 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 431. The
Senate report began with an explanation of how the existing environment actually invited fraud,
and thus necessitated legislative intervention:
Our Nation is in the midst of its most serious economic crisis since the Great
Depression. With each passing week, tens of thousands more Americans lose their jobs
to layoffs, and many thousands more are losing their homes to foreclosure. As we learn
more and more each day about the causes of this debacle, it is clear that unscrupulous
mortgage brokers and Wall Street financiers were among the contributors to this
economic collapse. With the new tools and resources in this bill, it will be easier to
ensure that all of those responsible for these financial crimes are held accountable.
While the full scope of the fraud that helped trigger the economic crisis is still
unknown, we do know a great deal about what went wrong. As banks and private
mortgage companies relaxed their standards for loans, approving ever riskier mortgages
with less and less due diligence, they created an environment that invited fraud. Private
mortgage brokers and lending businesses came to dominate the home housing market,
and these companies were not subject to the kind of banking oversight and internal
regulations that had traditionally helped to prevent fraud. We are now seeing the
results of this lax supervision and accountability.
....
Of course, the problem is not limited to mortgage frauds. As is so common in
today’s financial markets, home mortgages were packaged together and turned into
securities that were bought and sold in largely unregulated markets on Wall Street.
Here again, the environment invited fraud. As the value of the mortgages started to
decline with falling housing prices, Wall Street financiers began to see these
mortgage-backed securities unravel. Unfortunately, some were not honest about these
securities, leading to even more fraud and victimizing investors nationwide.
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however, the amendments exclusively emphasized the need to rein in the
financial sector and to recover money lost to fraud.39 Despite this purported
goal, neither the Act itself nor the legislative history reflected any limitations
along those lines.
Before the 2009 amendments, Representative Howard L. Berman, an author
of both the 1986 and 2009 legislation, delivered mixed messages regarding the
bill’s purpose.40 Berman stated that the amendments updated the law to
incorporate modern fraud schemes that drain the public purse.41 He then
explained that the FCA protects “all Government funds and property, without
qualification or limitation.”42 Together, these statements suggest that he
believes the FCA’s scope should be limitless in its pursuit of fraud against the
government, rather than limitless in the type of fraud to which it applies.

Id. The 2009 amendments came at a time of high government spending and outsourcing. See
Summary of Budget Receipts, supra note 29 (showing that the 2010 federal budget was an
estimated $3.8 trillion—the largest since the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
recording began). The combined cost to the U.S. government of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is
nearly $1 trillion. Richard Wolf, Afghan War Costs Now Outpace Iraq’s, USA TODAY, May 13,
2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm#. American military
action abroad has increased opportunities for business transactions with the American
government. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND AND
ANALYSIS 6–7 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf (noting that the
number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan is nearly equal to the number of the Department of
Defense’s uniformed personnel).
39. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 3–4, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 433. The Senate report explicitly
states that the 2009 amendments are designed to “protect from fraud the Federal assistance and
relief funds expended in response to our current economic crisis.” Id. at 4, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
433. The report later refers to the need to protect the $1 trillion spent on stabilizing the banking
system from “fraud or abuse.” Id., 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 432. Furthermore, FERA’s legislative
history repeatedly refers to the FCA in the context of recovering federal funds lost to fraud. See
id. at 1, 9–10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 436–37. Indeed, the title of the legislation is the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act. Id. at 1, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 430 (emphasis added).
40. 155 CONG. REC. E1295 (daily ed. June 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
41. Id. at E1295–300.
42. Id. at E1296. Representative Berman further noted:
In defining the word “claim” so broadly, Congress intended in 1986 to make sure that
the FCA would impose liability even if the claims or false statements were made to a
party other than the Government, if the payment thereon could potentially result in a
loss to the Government or cause the Government to wrongfully pay out money. For
example, because any fraud that reduces the effectiveness of programs and initiatives
the Government has sought to advance also undermines the Government’s purpose in
supplying funding support, Congress intended for a false claim to the recipient of a
grant from the United States or to a State under a program financed in part by the
United States, to be considered a false claim to the United States.
Id.
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4. Judicial Interpretations of the FCA’s Purpose
The Supreme Court recognized that the primary purpose of the FCA
naturally placed restraints on its scope. In 1943, the Court in United States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess articulated that the FCA’s purpose was “to provide for
restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud.”43 The Court
believed that Congress had included the then-double damages provisions to
ensure that the government was completely reimbursed.44 Fifteen years later,
however, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. McNinch that although
“Congress wanted to stop this plundering of the public treasury . . . . it is
equally clear that the False Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of
fraud practiced on the Government.”45 The Court recognized that Congress
wanted to protect government money and property, but only from fraudulent
claims against the government.46
The circuit courts agree with the Supreme Court’s reading of the FCA’s
purpose. The Third Circuit noted that the FCA targets “fraudulent activity
which attempts to or actually causes economic loss to the United States
government.”47 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has connected liability under the
Act to fraudulent claims intended to deprive the government of money,48 and
the Eleventh Circuit has held that liability hinges on “actionable damage to the
public fisc.”49 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit requires a “call upon the
government fisc” for liability to attach.50
B. The “Presentment Clause”
Since its inception, the FCA has required the presentation of a false claim to
the government.51 Section 3729(a)(1) of the United State Code makes this
requirement an explicit prerequisite for liability,52 and the judiciary had
43. 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943), superseded by statute Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat.
608 (repealed 1968).
44. Id. at 551–52.
45. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (internal footnote omitted); cf.
United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (explaining that the FCA reaches
“all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money”).
46. See Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958).
47. Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2001).
48. See Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[O]nly those
actions by the claimant which have the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay out
money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally deprive the United States of
money it is lawfully due, are properly considered ‘claims’ within the meaning of the FCA.”
(citations omitted)).
49. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir.
2002).
50. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999).
51. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch.
67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
52. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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implicitly included it in § 3729(a)(1)(B)53 until the FERA amendments in
2009.54 Even when Congress recodified the FCA in 1982,55 it intentionally
preserved the substance of the Act.56
The circuit courts have highlighted the relationship between the presentment
of a false claim, the FCA’s purpose of combating fraud against the
government, and the scope of the Act.57 In United States ex rel. Clausen v.
Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that “[w]ithout
the presentment of such a claim, while the practices of an entity that provides
services to the Government may be unwise or improper, there is simply no
actionable damage to the public fisc as required under the False Claims Act.”58
In United States v. Rivera, the First Circuit similarly explained that “the statute
attaches liability, not to the underlying fraudulent activity or to the
government’s wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for payment.’”59 Quoting
this language, the Fourth Circuit later agreed and added that “a central question
in FCA cases is whether the defendant ever presented a ‘false or fraudulent
claim’ to the government.”60
Most recently, in United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the presentment
requirement applied to § 3729(a)(2) of the FCA.61 In an opinion authored by
then-Chief Judge John Roberts, the D.C. Circuit noted that § 3729(a)(1)
unambiguously requires presentment of a false claim; therefore, the court did
not need to “debate the legislative history” to interpret the statute.62
Furthermore, the court read a presentment requirement into § 3729(a)(2), and
noted that the explicit presentment requirement in § 3729(a)(1) would be

53. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
54. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
55. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.02[A], at 1-16.
56. H.R. REP. NO. 97-651, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1895, 1897.
57. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
58. 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999)).
59. 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
60. Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785. The Supreme Court concurred based on a slightly different
rationale in Allison Engine, and argued that such an interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2)
“protect[s] the Government from loss due to fraud but also ensures that ‘a defendant is not
answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordinary and reasonable consequences of his
conduct.’” Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)
(quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 470 (2006)), superseded by statute,
FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 and 31 U.S.C.).
61. 380 F.3d 488, 500–01 (D.C. Cir. 2004), superseded by statute, FERA, 123 Stat. 1617.
62. Id. at 492–96.
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otherwise meaningless.63 District courts in several circuits have since followed
the Totten rationale.64
The Totten court foresaw the dangers of an FCA unfettered by a presentment
requirement.65 Abolition of the presentment clause, the court reasoned, would
render “the potential reach of the Act almost boundless.”66 The court
explained that without such a clause, liability could attach to any
institution—such as a college—that had received some federal funding.67
Furthermore, deciding the amount of federal money needed to cross the
liability threshold is “an imprecise line of demarcation” and would likely result
in increased collateral litigation under the FCA.68
C. The Definition of “Claim” for the Purposes of the FCA
Without a “claim,” there can be no liability under the FCA.69 Although the
FCA is arguably restricted to fraudulent attempts to acquire government
money or property,70 the definition of “claim” has expanded since the Act was
amended in 1986.
Before the 1986 amendments, little Supreme Court case law existed that
defined “claim.”71 In United States v. Cohn, the Court held that the fraud must
involve “a ‘claim upon or against’ the United States and the Treasury
Department.”72 The Supreme Court later strengthened the idea that a “claim”
involved a demand for government money in McNinch, and stated that “the
concept[] of a claim against the government normally connotes a demand for
money or for some transfer of public property.”73

63. Id. at 501.
64. See, e.g., United States v. City of Hous., No. H-03-03713, 2006 WL 2382327, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (finding that the City’s use of previously approved and allocated
Housing and Urban Development funds did not constitute the presentment of a claim to the
government under the FCA); United States v. Sequel Contractors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1142,
1150 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining that Totten “did not require that the defendants themselves
directly present the false claim to the federal government . . . [but rather] that someone must
directly present [the] false claim”); United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup III. Inc., No. 02-C6074, 2005 WL 2667207, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2005) (holding that false claims submitted to a
Medicaid intermediary satisfied the presentment requirement).
65. Totten, 380 F.3d at 496.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 497.
69. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (Supp. III 2009).
70. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (stating that the FCA
applies to “all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money”).
71. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 2.02[A], at 2-85 (stating that the Supreme Court addressed
this issue only three times before 1986).
72. 270 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1926).
73. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (quoting United States v. Tieger,
234 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1956)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Then, with the 1986 amendments, Congress defined “claim” for the first
time.74 This definition significantly expanded the term beyond prior
interpretations,75 by extending FCA liability to those who submit false claims
to recipients of government money.76
Since the 1986 amendments were enacted, courts have held that the term
“claim” applies to a wide variety of submissions,77 including: progress reports
on the status and success of a software system,78 a primary contractor’s false
billing certifications for subcontractors,79 false certifications of compliance
with Medicare,80 and false representations by a university to secure federal
education subsidies.81
More recently, just before the FERA amendments, the Fourth Circuit held in
United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC that a false claim made
to a grantee of government funding is a “claim” under § 3729(c), “so long as
‘any portion’ of the claim is or will be funded by U.S. money given to the
The Fourth Circuit’s holding foreshadowed the FERA
grantee.”82
amendments by expanding the term “claim” to encompass false claims for
property—regardless of whether the government had control of the property.83
D. The Private-Citizen Enforcement Mechanism
The FCA permits private citizens to bring lawsuits on behalf of the United
States (qui tam lawsuits) on a contingency-fee basis.84 This enforcement
74. BOESE, supra note 15, § 2.02[B], at 2-88 to 2-89.
75. FCAA, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 100 Stat. 3153, 3153–54 (1986) (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)).
For purposes of this section, “claim” includes any request or demand, whether under a
contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or
other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such
contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is
requested or demanded.
Id.
76. Id. § 2, 100 Stat. at 3154.
77. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 2.02[B][1]-[3], at 2-88 to 2-92.
78. United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 59 F.3d 196, 199 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
79. Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 106, 111–12 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
80. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d
1017, 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
81. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916–17 (7th Cir. 2005).
82. 562 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)).
83. Id. at 303–04.
84. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation
of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought
in the name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney
General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”); Beck, supra
note 22, at 541 (describing the mechanics of a qui tam statute).
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model is important because it provides private parties with standing to sue,
regardless of whether the private litigant suffered any harm.85
Qui tam actions arise when private parties—relators—receive the statutory
right to sue for damages in place of the U.S. government.86 When such suits
are successful, the relator and the government divide the proceeds according to
the statute.87
Although Congress provided qui tam provisions in the first iteration of the
FCA, private plaintiffs were uncommon until after the 1986 amendments.88
These amendments helped encourage qui tam litigation, as Congress
intended.89 The amended provisions guaranteed relators repayment of
expenses and attorneys’ fees, plus up to thirty percent of the government’s
recovery.90 Furthermore, the government’s preexisting knowledge of the
alleged fraud underlying the relator’s lawsuit could no longer provide a
jurisdictional bar, unless the information had been publicly disclosed and the
relator was not an original source of the information forming the suit’s basis.91
The 1986 amendments also provided protection for individuals who assisted in
bringing the qui tam lawsuit by creating a cause of action for victims of
employer retaliation.92
85. See Beck, supra note 22, at 543–44. The impact of the qui tam model is illustrated by
FCA statistics: of 712 new FCA matters in 2010, only 138 were not qui tam suits, compared to
574 qui tam actions. Fraud Statistics-Overview, supra note 16. As one enthusiastic
congressional supporter of the FCA queried, “What harm can there be if 10,000 lawyers in
America are assisting the Attorney General of the United States in digging up war frauds?”
BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.02, at 1–15 (quoting 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (1943) (statement of Sen.
Langer)).
86. “Qui tam” is part of the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur” meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
87. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006).
88. See BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-6.
89. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 23–24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288–89.
90. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). The relator receives a smaller award when the suit is
based primarily on publicly disclosed information or when the relator plans and initiates the
conduct giving rise to the claim. See id. § 3730(d)(1), (3).
91. See id. § 3730(e)(4).
92. FCAA, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 4, 100 Stat. 3153, 3157–58 (1986) (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or
her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or
others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation
of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be
entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include
reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the
discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination,
including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. An employee may bring an
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The strengthened qui tam provisions not only helped the Department of
Justice prosecute fraud,93 but also created a new cause of action by eliminating
prior government knowledge as a defense.94 The government extended the
reach of the FCA through the qui tam model because relators were more likely
than the government to pursue alleged frauds based on technical violations that
did not damage the public purse.95
E. Penalties and Damages Under the FCA
The 1986 amendments also increased the penalties for violating the FCA.96
Previously, the 1863 FCA levied penalties of $2000 for each false claim
submitted, in addition to twice the government’s losses.97 The 1986
amendments increased the available damages to three times the government’s
losses, as well as $5000 to $10,000 per false claim.98 Because civil penalties

action in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this
subsection.
Id.
93. The increasing number of qui tam cases illustrates the effectiveness of the
private-citizen enforcement model. In 1987, qui tam relators filed thirty cases in federal district
courts. Fraud Statistics-Overview, supra note 16. In 2010, by comparison, relators filed 574
claims, bringing the total number of qui tam cases filed by the end of 2010 to over 7000. Id.
94. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 948 (1997).
95. Id. at 949
96. FCAA, § 2, 100 Stat. at 3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)). Under the
more stringent statutory provisions:
[A person] is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person, except that if the court finds
that–
(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished officials of the
United States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all
information known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date
on which the defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such
violation; and
(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information about the
violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced
under this title with respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual
knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation;
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of the person. A person violating this
subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil
action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. The 1863
equivalent of $2,000 would have been more than $18,000 in 1986. 132 CONG. REC. 22,335
(1986) (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman).
98. FCAA, § 2, 100 Stat. at 3153..
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must be adjusted for inflation, the penalties have since increased to a minimum
of $5500 and a maximum of $11,000.99
Although the FCA provides for reduced damages in voluntary-disclosure
cases,100 no court has yet applied them.101 FCA penalties appear to be
mandatory on the statute’s face,102 and when courts have imposed damages,
they have awarded treble damages.103 Notwithstanding the language of the
statute, deciding the claims to which penalties apply provides leeway to courts
when imposing penalties.104
The government can also recover penalties and damages from the defendant
for the costs of the civil action.105 Moreover, § 3730(d) provides that qui tam
plaintiffs can recoup expenses and “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” from
the defendant.106
F. The Presentment Requirement and Allison Engine Company v. United
States ex rel. Sanders
In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, former employees of
General Tool Company (GTC) brought suit, alleging that invoices submitted to
naval shipyards by subcontractors Allison Engine Company, GTC, and
Southern Ohio Fabricators (SOFCO), were fraudulent.107 The claims asserted
that the relators work on the generator sets had not been completed in
accordance with the Navy’s specifications, and the three subcontractors issued
false certifications declaring that the work had been done properly.108 The
former employees sought to recover damages under three FCA sections:
§ 3729(a)(1), which concerns direct presentment of a false claim to the
government; § 3729(a)(2), which creates liability for using a false record or
99. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a) (2010).
100. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009).
101. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[E], at 1-23 to 1-24.
102. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); BOESE, supra note 15, §3.05[B], at 3-94.
103. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[E], at 1-23 to 1-24; see, e.g., United States v. Mackby,
339 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the imposition of treble damages and
penalties).
104. BOESE, supra note 15, § 3.05[B], at 3-94.
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (Supp. III 2009).
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006).
107. 553 U.S. 662, 665–66 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21. 123
Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.). The United
States Navy contracted with two shipyards, Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding, to build a
new fleet of over fifty guided missile destroyers. Id. The shipyards in turn contracted with
Allison Engine Company to build ninety generator sets for the destroyers, and Allison Engine
Company contracted with GTC to assemble the generator sets. Id. GTC then subcontracted with
SOFCO to manufacture parts of the generator sets. Id. at 666. Each subcontractor—Allison
Engine Company, GTC, and SOFCO—entered into an agreement that required the parties to build
ship parts to meet the Navy’s standards. Id. The contracts also required that a “certification of
conformance” be delivered with each generator. Id.
108. Id. at 666–67.
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statement to get a claim paid or approved; and § 3729(a)(3), which prohibits
conspiring to defraud the Government.109 At trial, the relators did not
introduce evidence that the shipyards submitted false claims to the Navy;
rather, they showed that false statements had been presented by the three
subcontractors to the shipyards.110
A divided Sixth Circuit panel held that liability could attach under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(2) and (3) without the presentment of a false claim to the
government.111 “The FCA,” the majority explained, “covers all claims to
government money, even if the claimant does not have a direct connection to
the government.”112 The court’s holding created a circuit split, as the Sixth
Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s Totten decision, in which the court
had held that the presentment clause applied to both § 3729(a)(1) and (2).113
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed with the Sixth Circuit that
§ 3729(a)(2) had no presentment requirement.114 In the unanimous decision,
however, the Court overturned the Sixth Circuit’s holding that liability under
§ 3729(a)(2) attached merely because a contractor paid a subcontractor’s false
claim using government funds.115 The Court noted that the statutory language
created liability when a defendant submitted a false record or statement “to
get” a claim “paid or approved by the government.”116 The Court interpreted
“to get” as an indication that the defendant must intend for the government to
pay the false claim, and not merely for a private third party to pay the claim
using government funds.117
Although the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the
presentment requirement in § 3729(a)(2),118 it expressed concerns over an
unchecked FCA.119 Without intent to defraud the government, the Court
stated, the “direct link” between a subcontractor’s false statement and the
109. Id. at 666.
110. Id. at 667.
111. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 615–16 (6th Cir.
2006), rev’d on other grounds, 533 U.S. 662 (2008), and superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L.
No. 111-21, 123 Stat. at 1617–31.
112. Id. at 618.
113. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
See supra Part I.B. for an in-depth discussion of Totten.
114. Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 671.
115. Id. at 665.
116. Id. at 668–69 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
117. Id. Similarly, for liability under § 3729(a)(3), a plaintiff “must show that the
conspirators agreed to make use of the false record or statement to achieve this end.” Id. at 665.
118. Id. at 671.
119. Id. at 669 (stating that a broad interpretation of the statute would allow liability to
“attach for any false claim made to any college or university . . . [that] received some federal
grants” (quoting United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir.
2004))).
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government’s decision to pay a false claim was too attenuated to prove
liability.120 This broader interpretation, the Court observed, “would expand the
FCA well beyond its intended role” and result in a statute whose reach was
“almost boundless.”121
G. FERA and the 2009 Amendments
In May 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,122 which expanded liability under the
FCA.123 By passing the FERA, Congress singled out the Allison Engine and
Totten decisions as incorrect interpretations of the FCA.124
1. The “Presentment Clause” and Intent to Defraud the Government
Before the FERA amendments, liability did not attach under § 3729(a)(1)
unless a defendant presented a false claim for payment or approval to an
“employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces
of the United States.”125 The 2009 amendments changed this requirement;
now, the false claim for compensation or approval can be presented to anyone
for payment, as long as the federal government has or will provide part of the
money to pay the claim.126
The amendments also removed language from § 3729(a)(1)(B) that the
Supreme Court relied on in Allison Engine to hold that a defendant must intend
for his false claim or statement to be material to the government’s decision to
pay or approve the claim.127 FERA also removed similar language from
§ 3729(a)(1)(C) and (G).128

120. Id. at 672 (“Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private
entities would threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.”).
121. Id. at 669 (quoting Totten, 380 F.2d at 496) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
123. Congress renumbered and modified all seven liability provisions of the FCA. Compare
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)–(7) (2006), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (Supp. III 2009).
124. S. REP. NO. 110-21, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. From
Congress’s perspective, “[t]he effectiveness of the FCA ha[d] been recently undermined by court
decisions limiting the scope of the law and allowing subcontractors and non-governmental
entities to escape responsibility for proven frauds.” Id. at 10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 437. The
FERA amendments were a correction and clarification of these judicial interpretations so as to
protect “the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to our current economic
crisis.” Id. at 4, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 433.
125. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
127. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009), with id. § 3729(a)(2) (2006); see
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 665 (2008), superseded by
statute, FERA, 123 Stat. at 1617–31.
128. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C), (G) (Supp. III 2009).
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Congress stated that it intended the amendments to uphold the FCA’s
original purpose, and that the amendments targeted subcontractors who
knowingly submitted false claims to general contractors for payment in
government money.129 Congress did not specify whether liability attaches to a
subcontractor who knowingly submits a false claim to another subcontractor
and is paid with government funds.130
2. “Claim” Redefined
Under the new definition of “claim”,131 a false claim to any recipient of
government money triggers liability if the money is intended for “the
Government’s [use] or to advance a Government program or interest.”132 This
phrase was not explained by the amendments and remains for courts to
define.133
3. New Qui Tam Protections
The FERA amendments notably widened protections for relators.134 Before
FERA, § 3730(h) only protected employees from retaliation by their
employers.135 Now, § 3730(h)(1) extends protection to contractors and
agents.136
Perhaps the most significant change to the whistle-blower protections is the
removal of statutory language that required retaliatory actions from the

129. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438.
130. Id.
131. As defined in the most recent version of the United States Code, the term “claim”:
(A) means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for
money or property and whether or not the United States has title to the money or
property, that—
(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or
(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is
to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government
program or interest, and if the United States Government—
(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or property
requested or demanded; or
(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded; and
(B) does not include requests or demands for money or property that the
Government has paid to an individual as compensation for Federal employment or
as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s use of the money or
property[.]
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
136. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1)–(2) (Supp. III 2009).
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employer.137 The statute, which previously provided a cause of action only
when the employer discriminated against the whistle-blowing employee,138
extended the bases of employer mistreatment that would give rise to a suit.139
H. The Mail-Fraud Statute and Vagueness Concerns
Congressional reactions to similar amendments to the mail-fraud statute140
provide an example of the dangers of vagueness and overbreadth.141 First
enacted in 1872—only nine years after the first FCA—the statute has often
been wielded by federal prosecutors142 in conjunction with the newer
wire-fraud statute.143 Described as the government’s primary weapon in the
137.
138.
139.
140.

Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (Supp. III 2009).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 2009). The mail-fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to
be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation
occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted,
transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major
disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.

Id.
141. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935–41 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that the honest-services statute was too vague to be saved by the Court’s interpretation);
Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1308–11 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If the ‘honest
services’ theory . . . is taken seriously and carried to its logical conclusion, presumably the statute
also renders criminal a state legislator’s decision to vote for a bill because he expects it will curry
favor with a small minority essential to his reelection; a mayor’s attempt to use the prestige of his
office to obtain a restaurant table without a reservation; a public employee’s recommendation of
his incompetent friend for a public contract; and any self-dealing by a corporate officer.”).
142. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Section
1341 of Title 18 U.S.C. has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as a first line of
defense. When a ‘new’ fraud develops—as constantly happens—the mail fraud statute becomes a
stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized
legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.”).
143. See supra note 9.
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fight against crime,144 prosecutors have used § 1341 and § 1343 as “catch-all”
statutes.145 Between them, these statues cover issues ranging from mailing
fraudulent prize-giveaway schemes,146 to sport-association rule violations147
and citizens’ rights to honest and fair government protection.148
The Supreme Court temporarily halted the expansion of liability under the
mail-fraud statute in McNally v. United States in 1987.149 In McNally, the
Court held that “[t]he mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but
does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government.”150
The Court interpreted the original purpose of the statute as protecting only
people’s money or property.151
Congress immediately responded to the McNally decision by enacting the
“honest services” statute—§ 1346—in 1988.152 This section defined the term
“scheme or artifice to defraud,” as “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of
the intangible right of honest services.”153 Through this language, the
amendment specifically covered “the intangible right to honest services”
protected by the lower courts.154
144. Brian C. Behrens, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering the Confusing Letters of
the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 489, 491 (1993).
145. Id. at 498.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221–22 (7th Cir. 1993).
148. Behrens, supra note 144, at 498. One former prosecutor went so far as to describe the
mail-fraud statute as “our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and
our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law
‘darling,’ but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity,
adaptability, and comfortable familiarity.” Rakoff, supra note 9, at 771 (internal citations
omitted).
149. 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100–690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
150. Id. at 356. Through its reasoning, the Court made clear:
[When] there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other,
we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite
language. . . . Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of
disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited
in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must
speak more clearly than it has.
Id. at 359–60.
151. Id. at 356.
152. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7603, 102 Stat. at 4508. As with previous mail-fraud
amendments, the legislative history of § 1346 is quite limited. From the timing of the amendment
and the pre-enactment debates, though, it is clear that the amendment was largely intended to
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in McNally. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 32,727, 33,297
(1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (“This amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where
that provision was before the McNally decision.”).
153. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7603, 102 Stat. at 4508.
154. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2000). Academics have heavily
criticized the intangible-rights doctrine. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. The Metastasis of Mail
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In 2010, the Supreme Court discussed the matter of honest-services fraud for
the first time since its 1987 McNally decision.155 Writing for the Court in
Skilling v. United States, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg limited the application
of § 1346 to bribery and kickback schemes—the core pre-McNally honest
services offenses.156 A broader reading of the statute, the Court argued, could
“render the statute impermissibly vague.”157
In a concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the
honest-services statute was void for vagueness, as it failed to provide fair
notice and encouraged arbitrary discrimination.158 He stated that the Court
should not dabble in statutory construction, but instead reverse the § 1346
conviction because the statute “fail[ed] to define the conduct it prohibits.”159
In both McNally and Skilling, the Court applied the doctrine of lenity to
resolve ambiguities in the mail-fraud statute.160 That doctrine accounts for
Fraud: The Continuing Story of the “Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1, 3 (1983) (arguing for statutory reform); Ezersky, supra note 9, at 1427 (contending that the
statute harms its supposed beneficiaries and offends principles of federalism); Daniel J. Hurson,
Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute—A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423,
424–26 (1983) (advocating for a redrafted statute with “a precise definition of a ‘scheme to
defraud’”); Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 225 (1992)
(arguing for a legislative amendment of the statute and strict judicial interpretation to curb the
wide applicability of the statute); Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial
Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 168–70 (1990) (cautioning
against the use of the honest-services statute without guidelines to direct its application); W.
Robert Gray, Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions
Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 562–63 (1980) (questioning the
use of the intangible-rights doctrine in political corruption cases).
155. See generally Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). Over the two decades
before it accepted certiorari in Skilling, the Court had various opportunities to construe the statute,
but it turned down these requests. Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate
Fiduciary Duties Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1,
4 (2010); see also Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1308 (2009) (denying certiorari).
156. 130 S. Ct. at 2928. The Court focused on the congressional intent in enacting
§ 1346, concluding that Congress “meant to reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services
law.” Id. at 2929. Surveying the pre-McNally case law, the Court observed that although the
Court of Appeals had disagreed over the honest-services doctrine, the core of cases “involved
offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes.” Id.
at 2930. Therefore, the Court reasoned, Congress must have “intended § 1346 to reach at least
bribes and kickbacks.” Id. at 2931.
157. Id. at 2931 n.42.
158. Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
159. Id. at 2940.
160. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 (“Holding that honest-services fraud does not encompass
conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks, we resist the
Government’s less constrained construction absent Congress’ clear instruction otherwise.”);
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (“Rather than construe the statute in a
manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read §
1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights.”), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug
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ambiguities in criminal statutes by narrowly construing the offending
language161 to provide citizens with fair notice of punishable conduct.162 As in
Skilling, courts use lenity to avoid invalidating a statute.163
II. THE DANGER OF AN OVERBROAD FCA
Since Congress attempted to clarify the FCA in 2009,164 potential liability
under the FCA is broader than ever before.165 Previously, legislative history
accompanying the amendments targeted subcontractors who knowingly
submitted a false claim to a general government contractor;166 however, the
new world of liability created by the amendments does not stop with that
Instead, any person—including a subcontractor—who
subcontractor.167
knowingly submits a false claim for payment to a private entity, or uses a false
statement that is material to a false claim, may be liable under the Act.168
Furthermore, liability no longer hinges on whether the government has title to
the money for which the claim is being paid.169 The statute only requires that
(1) at some point, the government provided the money to pay the claim or will
reimburse the money, and (2) the money was spent to advance a government
interest or program.170 Under the statute’s broad scope, the fungibility of
money will create a long chain of liability under the FCA.171

Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1346).
161. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 657–58 (1982). The Supreme Court has
also used lenity in civil contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S.
505, 517–18 (1992) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute that the Court construed in a civil
setting, but which also had criminal applications); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158
(1990) (stating that where a standard in a civil statute is “set forth in a criminal statute, it is
appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute’s
coverage”).
162. McNally, 483 U.S. at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct at 2907.
164. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 433 (“The False
Claims Act must be corrected and clarified in order to protect from fraud the Federal assistance
and relief funds expended in response to our current economic crisis.”).
165. See infra Part II.A.
166. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 438.
167. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(2) (Supp. III 2009) (providing no internal limits
to liability); S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10, reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 438 (noting that
limitation of the FCA’s scope has curbed the statute’s effectiveness).
168. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(2).
169. Id. § 3729(b)(2).
170. Id.
171. See infra Part II.A.
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A. Effect of Amendments
The Supreme Court’s fears regarding consequences of the relator’s
arguments in Allison Engine have been fully realized.172 In oral arguments for
Allison Engine, Chief Justice Roberts outlined the Supreme Court’s concerns
over an expanded FCA in a short hypothetical:
The government gives money to the State to build a school. The
school has to be painted as part of that, so the school contractor, the
prime contractor, takes some of the money from the Federal
Government and pays the painter. The painter needs to buy paint.
So the painter takes some of the Federal money and pays the paint
company. The paint company has to get the chemicals from
somebody. So the paint company takes some of the money and pays
the chemical company. And at that point, the chemical companies
fraudulently added, you know, a dollar on to the cost of the
chemicals. So that dollar goes all the way through. So the
Government ends up paying a dollar more because of the fraud five,
six, seven times down the line.173
The Chief Justice then asked whether a relator could bring an FCA suit against
the chemical company in this scenario; the Assistant to the Solicitor General
responded with a qualified “yes.”174
Chief Justice Roberts’s hypothetical is not unrealistic.175 In Allison Engine,
the relators sued three tiers of subcontractors out of hundreds that constructed
the warships.176 If a third-tier subcontractor can be held liable under the FCA,
then a sixth-, seventh-, or eighth-tier subcontractor can also be liable—the
current FCA contains no clear internal limits to liability.177
172. See supra text accompanying notes 118–21.
173. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 33.
174. Id.
175. The plain language of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 provides no obvious limits to liability, except
subsection (b)(2)’s requirement that the money at issue is “used on the Government’s behalf or to
advance a Government program or interest.” See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2).
176. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,
553 U.S. 662 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.) (No. 07-214).
177. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); supra text accompanying note 126. FCA liability comes
with a price. Although calculating damages and penalties can become complex, their significance
is easily grasped. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 3.01 for a detailed discussion of the application of
the FCA’s penalty and damage provisions. A Department of Justice attorney illustrated how
quickly damages and penalties can accrue:
Triple damages are substantial enough; but couple that with the $5,000–$10,000 in
penalties for each request . . . for reimbursement, and the government’s potential
damages mount very quickly. The math is easy to do: for every 100 false claims
a . . . provider submits, it can face liability for $1 million in penalties alone.
BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-15 (footnote omitted) (quoting Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address of the Annual Meeting of the A.B.A., Public
Contracts Section: Increasing Criminalization of Health Care (Aug. 11, 1991).
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B. The FCA is Overbroad, Vague, and Punitive
By expansively defining “claim” and eliminating any presentment
requirement, Congress created a statute with almost limitless reach.178 The
FCA now effectively transforms garden-variety fraud into fraud against the
government, thus betraying the statute’s intended purpose of protecting the
Department of Treasury from fraudulent claims for government money or
property.179
The lack of clear limits in the FCA raises questions of overbreadth and
Vagueness voids a statute when its prohibitions are
vagueness.180
To illustrate the potential reach of the new FCA through its damages and penalties provisions,
consider the following scenario: A small sixth-tier defense subcontractor knowingly submitted a
false claim for payment to a fifth-tier defense subcontractor as part of a private contract in which
the sixth-tier subcontractor provided machine-cleaning widgets. If any part of the sixth-tier
subcontractor’s false claim is paid or will be paid with money that was once released by the
Federal Treasury, and those widgets will be used to ultimately “advance a government interest or
program,” then the sixth-tier subcontractor is liable under the FCA.
To take the example further, imagine the sixth-tier subcontractor manufactured machinecleaning widgets that the fifth-tier subcontractor purchased to clean its shop-floor machinery.
Those widgets in turn are used to create components for a fourth-tier subcontractor. A general
government contractor eventually uses these components in some product for the U.S. Army.
The sixth-tier subcontractor does not realize, however, that its widgets are used to create a
product for the U.S. Army. Over a five-year contract with the fifth-tier contractor, the sixth-tier
subcontractor provided 540 widgets, at a true value of $200 each. However, in it its biweekly
invoice, the sixth-tier subcontractor overcharged the fifth-tier subcontractor by $50 for each
widget. This amounts to an overbilling by $27,000 and the submission of 130 false claims for
payment.
Under § 3729(a)(1)(G), there is a penalty of $5000 to $11,000 for each of these false claims,
plus triple the amount of damages suffered by the government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). Even
without any actual harm to the government, the sixth-tier subcontractor is potentially liable for
$1.43 million in penalties. If the government suffers financial harm, then the sixth-tier
subcontractor may have to pay an additional $81,000 in damages. Furthermore, the sixth-tier
subcontractor’s government contracting license may be revoked.
Before the most recent FCA amendments, the sixth-tier subcontractor would not be liable
under § 3729(a)(1)(A), as it did not directly present its false claims to the government. See
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (2006). Under Allison Engine, the sixth-tier subcontractor would also not be
liable under § 3729(a)(1)(B) because it had no intent to defraud the government. See Allison
Engine, 553 U.S. at 671–73.
178. See supra Part I.G.1–2.
179. See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
180. One commentator considers vagueness and overbreadth to be indistinguishable. See A.
G. A., Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,
75–85 (1960). Indeed, the Supreme Court often speaks of the doctrines together. See, e.g.,
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358–59, 358 n.8 (1983) (“[W]e have traditionally viewed
vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.”); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (“Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they
are vague . . . those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (“The objectionable quality
of vagueness and overbreadth . . . [depends] . . . upon the danger of tolerating . . . the existence of
a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.” (footnote omitted)). Even if
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unclear.181 Instead, laws must have sufficient clarity to provide “the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”182
This certainty prevents arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.183
These standards, however, are applied less strictly to civil enactments than to
criminal statutes, and a scienter requirement may “mitigate [the] law’s
vagueness.”184
Here, the FCA presents a fair-notice problem. Although the chemical
company in Chief Justices Robert’s hypothetical knowingly defrauded the
paint manufacturer, the chemical company was likely unaware that its actions
also defrauded the government under the FCA.185 As Justice Samuel Alito, Jr.
stated in the Allison Engine opinion:
In such a situation, the direct link between the false statement and the
Government’s decision to pay or approve a false claim is too
attenuated to establish liability. Recognizing a cause of action under
the FCA for fraud directed at private entities would threaten to
transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.186
Although fair-notice requirements are less stringent because the FCA is a
civil statute, the FCA’s punitive characteristics and unique qui tam
enforcement mechanism suggest it should be treated more like a criminal
statute, similar to the mail-fraud statute.187 Therefore, the severity of the civil
punishment meted out under the FCA indicates that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine applies.188
vagueness and overbreadth are treated separately, and one successfully argues that the FCA’s
language is not vague, the statute is still astoundingly overbroad. See generally supra Part II.A;
see also supra note 173 (describing the FCA’s overbreadth).
181. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (“Vague laws offend several
important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.” (footnotes omitted)).
182. Id. at 108.
183. See id. at 108–09.
184. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99
(1982).
185. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008),
superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
186. Id.
187. See infra Part II.B.
188. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (stating that the severity of
deportation as a punishment is cause to consider the void-for-vagueness doctrine in a civil
context).
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Legislative blurring of criminal and civil statutes has not gone unnoticed.189
Although courts and Congress have interpreted the FCA as a remedial
statute,190 one commentator argued that when a “statutory scheme [is] so
punitive” one questions whether the legislature “negate[d] that intention.”191
The Supreme Court has treated civil fines and criminal fines similarly when
considering possible violations of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits
excessive fines.192 The Court has stated that “a civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as
also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have
come to understand the term.”193 Furthermore, in United States v. Bornstein,
the Court recognized the partly punitive nature of the FCA194—a view echoed
by lower courts.195 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that although the FCA
does not specify whether its penalties are punitive or remedial, the “sanction
clearly has a punitive purpose.”196
The FCA’s treble damages further advance its punitive nature.197 In Cook
County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the dual remedial and punitive nature of the treble damages
provision.198 Moreover, the Court held that treble damages imposed by other

189. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (harmonizing criminal and civil statutes).
190. See supra Part I.A.1–4. (discussing the FCA’s purpose); see also infra Part II.B.
(analyzing the punitive and remedial nature of FCA).
191. David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587, 591 (1993) (quoting United States
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362–63 (1984)).
192. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (“The Eighth Amendment protects
against excessive civil fines . . . .”). A fine is unconstitutionally excessive if the payment to the
government constitutes punishment for an indiscretion, and the payment “is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 327–28, 334 (1998).
193. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
194. 423 U.S. 303, 309–10, 309 n.5 (1976) (“According to its sponsor, the False Claims Act
was adopted ‘for the purpose of punishing and preventing . . . frauds.’” (citations omitted)).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001).
196. Id.
197. As one commentator explained, “The penalty provisions are intended to deter fraudulent
conduct, especially when actual damages would be nominal. Where actual damages are not
nominal, the trebling of those damages deters as well as compensates, with the result that the
deterrence is multiplied without any consideration of the impact of such multiplied
deterrence . . . .” The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 62 (1993) (statement
of Rand L. Allen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
198. 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003). The assessment of both the penalty and treble damages are
automatic. See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1533–34 (11th Cir. 1988).
Consequential damages and pre-judgment interest, however, are not recoverable under the Act.
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statutes were also partly punitive.199
Although defendants liable under the FCA clearly do not face the harsh jail
sentences meted out to defendants convicted under §§ 1341 and 1343,200 the
lack of a requirement that the government show damages makes the FCA seem
punitive rather than remedial, especially in conjunction with the penalties,
treble damages, and costs provisions.201 Moreover, a government contractor
might be barred from future government contracting if it is found to have
violated the FCA.202 If a contractor commits fraud, it must also contend with
the associated stigma, regardless of whether it was consequently disbarred. 203
This loss of reputation alone can severely limit future contracting
opportunities.204
Furthermore, considering the FCA’s scienter requirements reemphasizes the
punitive nature of the statute. Section 3729 requires no showing of specific
intent to defraud.205 Instead, “deliberate ignorance of the truth” or “reckless
disregard of the truth” satisfies the intent element.206 In contrast, under the
mail and wire-fraud statutes, the government has to prove beyond a reasonable

See Cook County, 538 U.S. at 131; United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir.
1972).
199. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (describing treble damages in antitrust statutes as a “crucial deterrent to potential
violators”).
200. People who have violated the mail- or wire-fraud statutes can be fined up to $1 million
and imprisoned up to thirty years. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). However,
not all punishment necessarily entails incarceration. See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 204, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (requiring that courts order defendants to pay
restitution to victims in the case of certain crimes).
201. See United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), vacated by United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding the FCA’s penalty violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause). Halper, a manager of a New York medical laboratory, routinely overcharged the
government by overbilling Medicare for patient treatment. Id. He was convicted of sixty-five
falsely submitted claims, inflated by a maximum of $9 for each submission, totaling $585. Id. at
532–33. The Government, however, sought $130,000 in penalties under the FCA. Id. at 533.
Under the increased penalties of the 1986 amendments, his fine would have increased to between
$325,000 and $650,000. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 3.06[A], at 3-109 n.463. For his criminal
conviction under the FCA, he received two years in jail. Halper, 660 F. Supp. at 532.
202. See, e.g., Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of S.F., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 475
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the right of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission to
disbar a public-works contractor from bidding on projects for five years, after the Commission
determined the contractor had filed a false claim and had acted irresponsibly).
203. Frank LaSalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened
Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 522–23 (1995).
204. Id. at 523–25.
205. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009). To continue the example in note 177,
supra,—if a sixth-tier subcontractor submits false claims to a fifth-tier subcontractor with a
reckless disregard of the truth but no intent to defraud the government, the sixth-tier subcontractor
could be fined $1.43 million dollars for defrauding the government. See supra note 177.
206. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii).
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doubt207 that the defendant knowingly made false representations or that the
scheme was “reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence
and comprehension.”208
In light of the FCA’s punitive nature, Congress and the courts must take the
statute’s overbreadth concerns seriously. The FCA deserves to be treated as a
quasi-criminal statute because of the severity of its damages and forfeitures.
C. Strain on Judicial Resources
Even if the FERA amendments are not unconstitutionally overbroad, the
potential strain on the federal court system could be immense. The extended
reach of the FCA, coupled with the greater protection afforded to qui tam
relators,209 has created a situation ripe for the proliferation of qui tam suits.210
Already, the FCA is “the fastest growing area of federal litigation.”211 At
the outset of 2011, the Department of Justice had over 1300 qui tam cases
awaiting review.212 In the first quarter of 2011, there were thirty-nine newly
filed FCA cases.213
The number of cases is likely to grow as qui tam relators begin to appreciate
both the new opportunities to bring FCA suits and the increase in federal
budgets for enforcement actions.214 The government’s 2011 budget proposal
requested a $234.6 million increase from 2010 to be used in the Department of
Justice’s fight against fraud.215 This includes an additional 708

207. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is required to establish guilt for any criminal charge).
208. United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Kehr Packages,
Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir. 1991).
209. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Supp. III 2009).
210. See infra text accompanying notes 213–16.
211. Program Guide, Am. Bar. Assoc., The Eighth Annual National Institute on the Civil
False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement (June 2, 2010), available at http://new.abanet.org
/calendar/civil-false-claims-act-and-qui-tam-enforcement-2010/Documents/cen0cfc_Website
_Brochure_5-7-10.pdf.
212. Letter from Jim Esquea, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and
Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen.l, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator Charles E. Grassley
(Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://www.taf.org/DOJ-HHS-joint-letter-to-Grassley.pdf.
213. 2011 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 14, 2011)
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011Mid-YearFalseClaimsActUpdate.aspx. In
the first half of 2010 alone, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts issued more than
200 decisions citing the FCA. 2010 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 9,
2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFalseClaimsActUpdate
.aspx.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 215–16.
215. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice
FY 2011 Budget Request (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010
/February/10-ag-109.html.
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jobs—including positions for agents and attorneys—all assigned to tackling
fraud.216 An increased budget and staff should add to the number of FCA suits
brought by the Department of Justice.
D. Economic Costs of the FERA Amendments
The FERA amendments will also increase the cost of business for
government contractors and subcontractors. As the scope of potential liability
increases, more potential defendants will take measures to avoid litigation.217
In an effort to recover their costs, contractors facing a greater possibility of qui
tam actions will likely pass the increased business costs to consumers, which
includes the government.218
Moreover, expanding the FCA to cover all transactions paid with money
traceable to the government will hinder the reasonable and expeditious
resolution of contract disputes, as relators will intervene in private contractual
relationships, and cause longer, more costly litigation.219 Although FCA
lawsuits have proliferated over the past two decades, the government declined
to intervene in nearly two-thirds of these lawsuits, leaving them to be
prosecuted only by relators.220 When the government declines to intervene, an
“overwhelming majority” of cases result in no recovery,221 and although a
substantial number are dismissed, they still result in lengthy and expensive
litigation.222

216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Charles R. Ching, Harry R. Silver & Laura Laemmle-Weidenfeld, In-House
Counsel Beware: The False Claims Act Might Impact Your Business, ACC DOCKET, NOV. 2009,
AT 57, 65 (2009) (exhorting companies to be diligent in their FCA compliance efforts after FERA
broadened the statute).
218. See Jonathan T. Brollier, Note, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the
Incentive Structure of Qui Tam Actions Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
693, 705–07 (2006) (noting that the legal costs associated with FCA claims varies between
$250,000 and $500,000, but can be over $10 million depending on the complexity of the case).
219. See id. at 70 (“In a survey of defense contractors . . . [that examined] thirty-eight qui tam
claims which the government did not join, the firms’ average costs in external legal fees per case
was $1,431,660, whereas the mean governmental recovery under the False Claims Act in these
cases was just $97,223.”(footnote omitted)); see also Brief for Chamber of Commerce et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5–6, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,
553 U.S. 662 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.) (No. 07-214).
220. See Fraud Statistics-Overview, supra note 16.
221. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce, supra note 219, at 6 (discussing healthcare cases).
222. Id.
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III. THE SOLUTION: A LIMITING LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OR JUDICIAL
SOLUTION
The presentment clause falls into the category of the adage, “you don’t know
what you’ve got till it’s gone.”223 Described as the sine qua non of the FCA,224
the requirement that a false claim actually be submitted defined the FCA’s
Because of the punitive
scope by establishing clear outer limits.225
consequences of FCA liability, the bright-line function fulfilled by the
presentment requirement and utilized by the Supreme Court in Allison Engine
was particularly important.226 Whether or not Congress foresaw the potential
impact of the FERA amendments,227 the FCA now applies to a class of entities
that should not be liable under the Act, and who will need protection from the
statute. The absence of the presentment requirement and the presence of the
expanded definition of “claim,”228 provide no mechanism to prevent Chief
Justice Roberts’s slippery-slope scenario from unfolding.229
A. A Legislative or Judicial Limitation
A legislative amendment to the FCA would prevent a battle between
Congress and the Supreme Court, such as the one that occurred over the mailand wire-fraud statutes.230 Congress has two available solutions: change the
language of the FCA so that the statute’s reach has clear outer boundaries, or
provide for alternative-dispute-resolution options to weed out frivolous qui tam
cases.
1. Legislative Solution
Congress, in drafting the FERA amendments, not only reacted to the
depressed economic climate, but also to a small number of cases with unusual
223. JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise Records 1970).
224. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 130, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002)
(stating that the submission of a claim is not merely a “ministerial act” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
225. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (noting the consequences of the FCA remains the presentment clause), superseded by
statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 and 31 U.S.C.).
226. See supra Part I.F.
227. Some lawmakers were clearly concerned about the FERA amendments. See 155 CONG.
REC. S4559 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (calling FERA a “typical kneejerk reaction”).
228. See supra Part I.G.1–2.
229. See supra Part II.A.
230. See supra Parts I.G. and I.M. Senator Patrick Leahy recently sponsored the Honest
Services Restoration Act, which clarifies and expands the definition of a “scheme or artifice to
defraud” with respect to mail- and wire-fraud. Honest Services Restoration Act, S. 3854, 111th
Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong
_bills&docid=f:s3854is.txt.pdf.
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facts.231 Congress eliminated specific language from the statute,232 and created
a vague limiting condition for liability to ensue: that the government money or
property involved be “used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a
Government program or interest.”233 Although Congress believed these FERA
amendments would bring the FCA into the twenty-first century,234 it failed to
grasp the complexities of conducting business in the modern age. These
amendments, which apply to the entire spectrum of FCA cases, prevent
businesses from clearly discerning when they have violated the FCA and thus
subjected themselves to damages and fines.
Any amendment must reflect the real difference between doing business
directly with the government and operating a business that has an attenuated
connection to the government. Further, such an amendment must also account
for the complexities of government contracting.
First, Congress must define the ambiguous condition that the money or
property at issue “advance a Government program or interest.”235 Any
definition must answer several questions. For example, what is a government
interest? How significant must the interest be? And, how should such money or
property advance this government interest? A definition that covered these
points would give greater notice of the statute’s reach to contractors and
members of the public. Ideally, Congress would also introduce an intent
element to § 3729(a)(1)(A), similar to the requirement inferred by the Supreme
Court in Allison Engine.236 Ultimately, any amendment to the FCA needs to

231. The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most
Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 2041 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 25 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of John T. Boese) (arguing
that the amendment “is intended to overrule United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles,
LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005). [This] decision . . . concerned allegedly false claims
to the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) in Iraq, an international entity that ceased to exist
in 2004. This is one case out of thousands brought under the FCA since 1986. Even if published
reports of other sealed cases involving allegedly false claims to the CPA are true, amending the
False Claims Act so drastically to allow it to apply to a small category of cases that are so
unique—and incapable of repetition—is simply unnecessary and threatens the viability of
American businesses” (footnotes omitted)).
232. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
233. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 2009).
234. See Hearing supra note 231, at 3 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“So I hope all Senators will
join us to honor the legacy of Lincoln’s law and take action now to strengthen and improve the
False Claims Act for the next century.”); 155 CONG. REC. S4775 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Durbin) (“This legislation will help keep Lincoln’s Law strong for the 21st
century.”).
235. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).
236. See supra Part I.F. The introduction of a second scienter requirement is unlikely,
however, because Congress specifically overruled Allison Engine’s holding in FERA. See supra
notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
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send a clear message that the statute does not and should not apply to every
kind of fraud.237
As an alternative to a statutory amendment, Congress could mandate
arbitration or mediation.238 Such a requirement could mitigate the expense and
time of litigation, while weeding out meritless qui tam cases,239 because when
the government has agreed to arbitration in its contract, it is obliged to
participate in the arbitration process just as any private party.240 Therefore, the
government cannot avoid its contractual obligations merely by an FCA suit.241
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal statutory claims are resolvable
through arbitration,242 yet no provision exists requiring parties to FCA claims

237. The Supreme Court in Allison Engine expressed concern that if fraud directed at private
entities was recognized as a cause of action under the FCA, the statute would become an
“all-purpose antifraud statute.” See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S.
662, 672 (2008), , superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.); see also supra note 120 and accompanying
text. In oral arguments for Allison Engine, Justice Scalia commented that the FCA “doesn’t have
to cover every ill in the world,” and Justice Breyer suggested that under the Government’s
interpretation of the FCA, everything would become subject to the statute. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 1, at 36–37. The Supreme Court made a similar argument in Skilling,
ruling that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 only applied to kickbacks and bribery schemes. Skilling v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2906 (2010).
238. Although arbitration and mediation both come under the umbrella of alternative dispute
resolution (and produce non-binding resolutions unless otherwise agreed upon), they are different
processes. Black’s Law Dictionary defines arbitration as “[a] method of dispute resolution
involving one or more neutral third parties who are [usually] agreed to by the disputing parties
and whose decision is binding.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed., 2009). Mediation is
defined as “[a] method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who tries
to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution.” Id. at 1070–71. Mediation is
not binding unless agreed upon, and, like arbitration, there is no universal recognition for
mediation in FCA cases. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (2006).
239. Nothing in this concept is meant to prevent a criminal prosecution by the government of
the presentment of false claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C §§ 286–87. Sections 286 and 287 are for
egregious cases and any suggestion that arbitration should preclude criminal prosecution is
beyond the scope of this Comment. See 18 U.S.C. §§286–87 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
240. United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2001).
241. Id.
242. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“[E]ven claims arising
under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because ‘so long as
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum,’ the statute serves its functions.” (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991))). The FCA provides the government with authority to use arbitration or
mediation. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (2006) (“[T]he Government may elect to pursue its claim
through any alternate remedy available to the Government, including any administrative
proceeding to determine a civil money penalty.”); see also Bankers, 245 F.3d at 326 (“A plain
reading of these provisions [SS 3730(b),(c)(5)] reveals that Congress has granted the Attorney
General authority to elect arbitration at his or her discretion, at least in cases wherein a private
party has initiated the action.”).

232

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:201

to go through initial arbitration or mediation before litigation.243 However,
mediation in FCA cases is not uncommon, and courts may order mediation for
the parties to agree on a settlement.244 Moreover, the Attorney General can,
under § 3730(c)(5), resolve FCA disputes by arbitration or mediation if he so
chooses.245
Requiring alternative dispute resolution before litigation would mitigate the
economic costs of the FERA amendments and act as a de minimis hurdle for
cases that should not be in the formal judicial process. Creating a buffer for
federal courts will be particularly important as qui tam suits multiply.
2. A Judicial Solution: A Narrow Interpretation
The alternative to a legislative solution is a judicial remedy—the Supreme
Court could act as it did in Skilling to prevent the FCA from being
unconstitutionally vague.246 Already, the FCA presents serious fair-notice
concerns, as it has never been clear whether subcontractors who have a more
attenuated relationship with the government are liable under the Act.247 The
Supreme Court should clarify liability as the FCA was not designed to police
the chemical company in Chief Justice Roberts’s hypothetical or the defense
subcontractor who manufactures nuts and bolts for the U.S. Army.248
The Supreme Court can limit the FCA by narrowly interpreting the Act’s
new language. FERA amended the definition of “claim” to include the
requirement that the government’s money or property be “used on the
Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest.”249 The
plain language of this addition is not indicative of its potential application, as it
is ambiguous and statutorily undefined.
In interpreting this term, the courts should look to the language of the
statute, the statute’s design and objective,250 and the relevant legislative
243. An exception does exist for employment agreements that lawfully prohibit FCA
antiretaliation suits by requiring arbitration. United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown &
Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 380–81 (4th Cir. 2008). Arbitration in employment agreements aside,
nothing obligates qui tam litigants to participate in arbitration where the Government and
defendant have a contract containing an arbitration clause.
244. See, e.g., Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing
previous court-ordered mediation for settlement); United States ex rel. Alderson v.
Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1330 (M.D. Fla., 2001) (noting that the court
referred parties to mediation after several years of litigation).
245. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5).
246. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010).
247. See supra Part II.A.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 173–74, 177.
249. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. III 2009).
250. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to
the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and
policy.”)).

2011]

False Claims Act Liability: Where to Draw the Line

233

history.251 If ambiguity still remains, the court may turn to the principle of
lenity in favor of a narrower interpretation.252 Although the principle of lenity
is usually reserved for criminal statutes, the Supreme Court has used it in civil
contexts.253 Although the FCA’s criminal and civil provisions have been
technically separated since 1982, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that the
language of the civil statute has not materially changed and concluded “there is
no reason to believe that the language should be interpreted any differently
now than it should have been in 1909 (or 1982).”254
Furthermore, given the Supreme Court’s recognition of the punitive nature
of the FCA,255 extending the rule of lenity to the FCA makes sense.
Regardless of the lenity doctrine, the Act’s legislative history and purpose
provide the Court with sufficient support to construe the statute narrowly. The
legislative history reveals the FCA’s very specific purpose: protecting the U.S.
Treasury against fraudulent claims,256 excluding garden-variety frauds.257 A
common-sense interpretation of the government’s motive supports the position
that Congress did not intend for the FCA to apply to every type of fraud.
IV. CONCLUSION
In amending the FCA to reflect modern fraudulent conduct against the
government, Congress hastily changed the statute, designed to protect the
Federal Treasury, to instead cover fraudulent behavior with little or no
connection to the government.
The FCA’s unique inclusion of punitive damages and fines provisions, and
its qui tam enforcement mechanism, demand that the consequences of any
amendments be seriously considered.

251. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (endeavoring to examine “the
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the Act” to determine the
meaning of a statute).
252. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have always resolved
lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope
even after resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the
statute” (quoting Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387 (1980))).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 (1992).
254. United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702,
734 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Cook County Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119,
132 (2003) (refusing to infer that Congress redefined the term “person,” simply because Congress
was silent on the matter in the 1986 amendments).
255. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993); supra Part II.B.
256. See supra Part I.A.
257. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S4540 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(“[T]he government does not intend to make actionable under the FCA any garden-variety dispute
between a general contractor and a subcontractor simply because the general receives some
federal money. On the other hand, if the transaction is still predominantly Federal in character,
and the false claim results in a loss to the government, recovery under the FCA should not be
precluded simply because the claim was not directly presented to the government . . . .”).
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Although the consequences of the FERA amendments cannot be predicted
with certainty, the experience of the mail- and wire-fraud statutes serve as a
clear warning of potential pitfalls. Given the similarity between the FCA and
those two statutes, Congress or the Supreme Court should act to protect parties
that have not intentionally committed fraud against the government.

